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The Dimming of Antitrust Enforcement
in the California Electricity Crisis
ROBERT B. MARTIN, III*




On an uncommon day in January 2001, the traffic lights went dark in
San Francisco. Power was cut to police departments, fire stations, and
state buildings. Students were trapped in elevators. Shopkeepers sold
cigarettes by candlelight.'
From November 1999 through May 2001, California suffered an un-
precedented electricity crisis, where state consumers experienced electri-
cal blackouts and service interruptions on thirty-eight days.' Even when
power was available, consumers faced a constant threat of further black-
outs and interruptions? The blackouts disrupted commerce, jeopardized
public safety, and "directly affected approximately one-third of all Cali-
fornians served by the three major investor-owned utilities [(IOUs)]."4
William Massey, then Commissioner of the Federal Energy Regulatory
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004; B.A. Claremont
McKenna College, 1998. I would like to extend my greatest thanks to Dean Ashutosh Bhagwat, whose
expertise and encouragement made this Note possible. Special thanks also to my family for their love
and support, and to Brigid, of course, for bringing a little light to the law.
I. Maria L. La Ganga & John M. Glionna, Life Goes On, Colder and Dimmer, As Lights Go
Out, L.A. TIMES, Jan. i8, 2001, at Ai.
2. CAL. PUB. UTILITIES COMM'N, WHOLESALE GENERATOR INVESTIGATION REP. 1 (2002), available
at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/energy/cpuco91702rpt.pdf [hereinafter CPUC REPORT].
3. Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to Promote a
Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1768, 1768-69 (2002).
4. CPUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. During the crisis, the three major IOUs were Pacific Gas &
Electric Company (PG&E), Southern California Edison Company (SCEC), and San Diego Gas &
Electric Company (SDG&E), covering northern California, southern California, and San Diego, re-
spectively, Id. at 8-9.
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Commission (FERC), described the widespread chaos as an "apoca-
lypse" in the power industry
The crisis brought massive increases in wholesale (and to some ex-
tent, retail) electricity prices. Before the crisis, wholesale electricity
prices averaged between $25 and $30 per megawatt-hour.6 During the
height of the crisis from June 2000 to January 2001, average prices sky-
rocketed to between $i00 and $294 per megawatt-hour.7 Existing retail
price caps forced the IOUs to absorb most of the cost increases, rather
then passing them on to retail customers. This forced the IOUs "between
a fiscal rock and a hard place," rendering two of the IOUs insolvent and
8leading to the bankruptcy filing of PG&E. Wholesale electricity genera-
tors (WEGs)9 then began to refuse to sell electricity to the IOUs, result-
ing in a standoff which eventually required the California government to
step in to ensure residents would still have electricity."°
Regarding the cause of the crisis, Dr. Paul L. Joskow, a professor at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, wrote: "[t]here are five pri-
5. Nicholas W. Fels & Frank R. Lindh, Lessons from the California "Apocalypse:" Jurisdiction
over Electric Utilities, 22 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1 (2001). FERC, a federal agency, regulates "the transmission
of electric energy in interstate commerce and ... the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate
commerce." I6 U.S.C. § 824(b)(i) (2000). In 1977, FERC succeeded the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) which held equivalent authority over the transmission and sale of electricity in interstate com-
merce. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENERGY MARKETS: CONCERTED ACTIONS NEEDED BY FERC
TO CONFRONT CHALLENGES THAT IMPEDE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHrT 2 (2002), available at http://www.gao
.gov/new.items/do2656.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
6. CPUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 12; John M. Broder, California Power Failures Linked to En-
ergy Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. i8, 2002, at A22. Generally, one megawatt-hour can power ap-
proximately 750 homes for one hour. Paul Joskow, California's Electricity Crisis, 17 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL'Y 365,375 (2001) [hereinafter Joskow I].
7. Fels, supra note 5, at 12.
8. Rossi, supra note 3, at 1778. As the energy markets in California were never fully deregulated,
price caps remained on retail power sales, but did not exist on wholesale power sales. Id. During the
price spikes, wholesale prices shot above the retail price cap, forcing the IOUs to pay far more for
wholesale electricity than they were able to sell it for on the retail market. See id. The price variance
led to both PG&E and SDG&E becoming insolvent. Joskow I, supra note 6, at 377. PG&E formerly
declared bankruptcy on April 6, 2001. Id. at 365-66. For additional information on the IOUs' travails,
see generally Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d l16, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
9. The major WEGs in California during the crisis included: Duke Energy North America, LLC
(Duke), Dynegy Power Marketing, Inc. (Dynegy), Mirant Americas Energy Marketing, LP (Mirant),
Reliant Power Generation, Inc. (Reliant), and AES Corporation/Williams Energy Marketing and
Trading Company (AES/Williams). See CPUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 n.i. Those five WEGs pos-
sessed a substantial market share within the California electricity generation market. See id. at 9 (stat-
ing the WEGs held a combined thirty-eight percent of the generation capacity of California market).
Io. See Joskow I, supra note 6, at 366. From January to August 2001, California ultimately spent
around $Io billion in state funds to buy power from wholesale electricity generators. Id. It also entered
into long-term wholesale electricity purchase contracts involving commitments exceeding $6o billion.
Id. Rejecting challenges by the California government, FERC recently upheld the validity of $12 bil-
lion of those long-term contracts. Jonathan Peterson & Elizabeth Douglass, Regulators Press Energy
Firms but Uphold Disputed Contracts, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2003, at AI.
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mary interdependent factors: (i) rising natural gas prices, (ii) a large in-
crease in electricity demand in California, (iii) reduced imports from
other states, (iv) rising prices for nitrogen oxide (NO.) emissions credits,
and (v) market power problems."" This Note focuses upon that last fac-
tor: market power problems created by alleged market manipulations by
the WEGs participating in the California electricity market.
Part I introduces the national move toward electricity deregulation
and, in particular, California's implementation of its own deregulation
scheme. It then summarizes publicly available indications of price ma-
nipulation and market power abuse by the WEGs.
Part II introduces the Sherman Antitrust Act and demonstrates why
section I of the Sherman Act (hereinafter "section i") is aptly suited to
remedy past market power abuse within the California electricity market,
and to deter future abuses. Part II also examines three antitrust "immu-
nities" which limit the application of section I to the California crisis, in-
cluding the filed rate doctrine which will likely bar private section I
actions arising from the crisis.
Part II observes, however, the extremely poor fit of the filed rate
doctrine to the facts of the crisis militates against its application to re-
lated section i actions. Due to that poor fit and the substantial criticism
surrounding the doctrine, Part II suggests courts could construe the doc-
trine narrowly and avoid applying it to those actions.
Yet courts will likely adhere to the doctrine, and so Part III assesses
the ability of FERC to remedy alleged market manipulations committed
during the crisis and deter future abuses. As the Agency's powers appear
largely inadequate to perform those functions, this Note calls upon Con-
gress to overrule the filed rate doctrine, thus allowing application of sec-
tion I with its concomitant remedies and deterrents, or alternatively to
endow FERC with expanded authority to prevent similar market ma-
nipulations in the future.
1. THE DEREGULATION OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
Before the latter part of the twentieth century, federal and state
governments largely regulated electricity markets as natural monopolies.
Electricity markets are vital to the "public interest" due to the impor-
tance of electricity to the economy as a whole, and strict regulation was
necessary to decrease the possibility of market power abuse arising from
the natural monopolies.'2 By controlling electricity prices, profits, and en-
i i. Joskow I, supra note 6, at 377.
12. See Ray S. Bolze et al., Antitrust Law Regulation: A New Focus for a Competitive Energy In-
dustry, 21 ENERGY L.J. 79, 79-80 (2000); Stuart M. Reynolds, Jr., The Relationship of Antitrust Laws to
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try into the markets, the broad regulations sought to ensure "reasonable
prices, non-discrimination and reliability" in the electricity markets. 3 Yet
public support of the broad regulations began to erode because of an
emerging view that competitive electricity markets could achieve greater
benefits and efficiencies. " Beginning in the late 1970s, various legislative
enactments began "deregulating" electricity markets to allow WEGs to
compete for customers and for the market to establish prices. 5
The basic theory behind deregulation was to move away from the
use of regulated "cost-of-service" rates and replace them with competi-
tively determined "market-based" rates. Cost-of-service rates established
electrical retail prices by adding a utility's cost with a reasonable rate of
return. 6 Market-based rates established electrical retail prices through
free-market competition.' 7 This move to market-based rates placed a
greater reliance on competition, "thus resulting in improved efficiencies,
lower costs, and ultimately lower prices for consumers."'
A. FERC PUSHES FOR DEREGULATION
Beginning in the late i98os, FERC began encouraging deregulation
in energy markets by granting WEGs "the authority to sell at 'market-
based rates' if they could show that they lacked market power and that
the prices at which they sold power would reflect the interplay of supply
and demand in well-functioning markets."' 9 In 1996, through Orders 888
and 889, FERC adopted the "open access rule," which required IOUs to
open their respectively owned electricity transmission networks to their
competitors.0 This rule prevented IOUs from discriminating against their
Regulated Industries and Intellectual Property in the New Marketplace, 4 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
I, 12 (2002).
13. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1O31; see Reynolds, supra note 12, at 12.
14. See Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1031.
15. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 22; Cf. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of i978, 16 U.S.C.
§ 26oi (200o) (opening wholesale electric markets to non-utility electricity generators and allowing
rates to be set not through cost-of-service regulation, but upon methods similar to competitive, mar-
ket-based mechanisms).
16. In re Cal. Wholesale Elec. Antitrust Litig., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1074 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (defin-
ing cost-of-service rates as "retail rates based upon cost and reasonable rate of return"); GAO REPORT,
supra note 5, at 4 (basing cost-of-service rates upon a utility's cost plus a fair return on investment).
17. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
i8. Id. at i9; Reynolds, supra note 12, at 13.
i9. Joskow I, supra note 6, at 367; see Lynch, 26 F. Supp. 2d at Io36 (noting FERC approval "of
wholesale energy sales at market-based rates.., in an effort to develop competitive bulk power mar-
kets"). FERC estimated deregulation of the wholesale electricity industry would result in annual sav-
ings from $3.8 billion to $5.4 billion. Jeffery D. Schwartz, Comment, The Use of the Antitrust State
Action Doctrine in the Deregulated Electric Utility Industry, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (I999).
20. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 23.
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competitors by denying them equal access to the transmission networks
used in the transmission and distribution of wholesale electricity.2'
To further this policy, FERC encouraged IOUs to "functionally un-
bundle" their generation and transmission operations, where IOUs
would separate their previously vertically integrated generation, trans-
mission, and distribution networks." The IOUs would retain ownership
of their transmission and distribution networks, but the generation of
electricity was left to independent, non-IOU WEGs.23 FERC also en-
couraged establishment of Independent System Operators (ISOs).24
IOUs would transfer operating control of their transmission facilities to
an ISO, which would "control the power system ... without special in-
terest" as it would "own no generation, transmission or load." 5
FERC Order 888 involved a preemptive assertion of authority to re-
quire WEGs subject to its jurisdiction to adopt a standard tariff for
transmission service to IOUs. FERC, however, limited its jurisdiction to
WEGs only, leaving states to regulate IOUs and retail customers."
B. CALIFORNIA'S DEREGULATION OF ITS ELECTRICITY MARKET
Beginning with the California Public Utilities Commission's (CPUC)
1995 decision to deregulate the state's $23 billion electricity industry,
California became "the first state to deregulate retail power markets on a
mass scale." 7 In 1996, the California Legislature unanimously enacted
the Public Utilities-Electrical Restructuring Assembly Bill 189o (AB
189o), approving most of CPUC's initiative and formally deregulating the
electricity markets. 8 Through deregulation, the state legislature intended
to benefit retail electricity customers by moving to "a framework under
which competition would be allowed in the supply of electric power. ' 9
21. See id. Upon issuance of FERC Order 888, Elizabeth Anne Moler, the FERC Chairwoman at
the time, stated "the future is here-and the future is competition." Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1452.
22. See 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385 (1996) [hereinafter FERC Order 8881; 18 C.F.R. Pt. 37 (1996)
[hereinafter FERC Order 8891; GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 23.
23. In re Cal. Wholesale Elec. Antitrust Litig., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1074-75 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
24- See FERC Order 888, I8 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385 (1996): GAO REPORT. supra note 5, at 23.
25. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 23.
26. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that FERC's jurisdiction could extend to wholesale power
generation even where the generating plant and retail consumer are within the same state. See N.Y. v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 535 U.S. i. 20-21 (2002); Rossi, supra note 3, at 1783-84.
27. Rossi, supra note 3, at 1768.
28. See Public Utilities-Electrical Restructuring, A.B. No. 189o, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995),
1996 Cal. Stat. 854 (1996) [hereinafter AB 189o]; Robert C. Fellmeth, Plunging Into Darkness: Energy
Deregulation Collides with Scarcity, 33 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 823, 832 (2002).
29. AB 189o, 1996 Cal. Stat. 854, § io. The California Legislature's intent to create a competitive
energy market pervades AB 189o. See § i(a) (AB 189o will "ensure ... [a] transition to a more com-
petitive electricity market structure" and "create[] a new market structure that provides competitive,
low cost and reliable electric service."); § to ("Generation of electricity should be open to competition
November 20031
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Similar to FERC Order 888, AB 189o required IOUs to separate
their generation operations from their transmission and distribution op-
erations.3" To facilitate this unbundling, AB 189 o created two entities to
operate the new competitive electricity market: the California Independ-
ent System Operator (CAISO) and the California Power Exchange
(CAPX).3'
CAISO32 served as an independent operator of the electricity trans-
mission network. IOUs transferred operating control (but not owner-
ship) of their transmission facilities to CAISO,33 which then controlled
the statewide transmission grid and directed the necessary purchases of
electricity to ensure the reliable operation of the electrical grid.34
CAPX35 operated "an efficient, competitive auction to meet electric-
ity loads of [CAPX] customers. '' , 6 Open on a nondiscriminatory basis to
all WEGs, CAPX matched bids by the WEGs for the supply of wholesale
electricity with demand bids by the IOUs.37 Through the bid-matching,
the CAPX auction determined short-term wholesale electricity prices
and utility generation should be transitioned from regulated status to unregulated status through
means of commission-approved market valuation mechanisms.").
3
o
. AB 189o, 1996 Cal. Stat. 854, § Io.
31. AB i89o, t996 Cal. Stat. 854, § i(c); see § to ("competition will best be introduced by the
creation of an Independent System Operator and an independent Power Exchange"). Pursuant to
FERC Order 888 governing transmission operators, FERC held regulatory authority over both
CAISO and CAPX. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d Io16, 102O (N.D. Cal. 2002); In
re Cal. Wholesale Elec. Antitrust Litig., 244 F. Supp. 2d io72, 1074-75 (S.D. Cal. 2003); see generally
FERC Order 888, i8 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385 (1996); Joskow I, supra note 6, at 371. California retained
regulatory jurisdiction over the delivery of retail electricity over the IOUs' transmission and distribu-
tion systems. AB 189
o
, 1996 Cal. Stat. 854, § tO. Economists generally recognize the wholesale power
generation market is better-suited to competition, while local transmission and distribution networks
are more apt to exist as natural monopolies. See Rossi, supra note 3, at 1775 (citing RICHARD F. HIRSH,
POWER Loss: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY
SYSTEM 101-17 (999)).
32. Pursuant to AB 189o, CAISO is a non-profit, public benefit corporation. 1996 Cal. Stat. 854,
§ i(c); Joskow I, supra note 6, at 369, 371.
33. AB 189o, 1996 Cal. Stat. 854, § IO.
34. AB 189o, 1996 Cal. Stat. 854, § I(c); see Cal. Wholesale Elec., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1074-75;
Joskow I, supra note 6, at 371-72; cf. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 23 n.l t (encouraging IOUs to
commit operating control of transmission facilities to ISOs to protect against improper exercise of
"special interest[s]"); Fels, supra note 5, at 8 (CAISO "responsible for assuring non-discriminatory
access and system reliability").
35. CAPX is also a non-profit corporation, AB 189 o , 1996 Cal. Stat. 854, § i(c), but operates in-
dependently of CAISO. See Fels, supra note 5, at 8. Due to the California crisis, CAPX stopped oper-
ating in January 2001 and subsequently declared bankruptcy on March 9, 2001. See Fels, supra note 5,
at 12; Joskow I, supra note 6, at 383.




through a competitive, market-based rate structure.3s AB 189o required
all IOUs to fill the vast majority of their day-ahead electricity demand
through CAPX.3 9
By holding control of the transmission and distribution networks,
CAISO and CAPX essentially operated as a clearinghouse for the sale
and purchase of electricity. WEGs would sell electricity to the IOUs
through CAPX, and CAISO would safeguard the balance of the electric-
ity grid by procuring power to maintain the stability of the grid if CAPX
did not meet customer demand. 4o
Pursuant to FERC regulatory authority,4 CAISO and CAPX filed
tariffs with FERC. The Agency reviewed and approved those tariffs in
accordance with their responsibility to ensure "just and reasonable
rates."42 The tariffs "comprised the rules for trading in the California
wholesale electricity markets" and bound the WEGs in their participa-
tion within those markets. 3 The WEGs also filed tariffs with FERC,
seeking authorization to sell electricity on CAPX and other wholesale
markets at wholesale rates.'
In granting these [tariffs], FERC applied its standard analysis, looking
at the share of generation capacity controlled by the [WEG applicant]
and its affiliates in a geographic market usually comprised of northern
California, southern California, or both. This form of analysis did not
entail any inquiry into overall supply and demand projections, nor did
it examine how the market as a whole would function under antici-
pated conditions.45
None of the tariffs approved by FERC were tested on judicial review.46
38. Cal. Wholesale Elec., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1074-75; see Joskow I. supra note 6, at 369 (noting
CAPX sold power on a day-ahead and hour-ahead basis).
39. Joskow I, supra note 6, at 369 (CAPX accounted for eighty percent of retail electricity sales in
California); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lynch, 2 16 F. Supp. 2d Iot6, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
40. See Cal. Wholesale Elec., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1074-75; Paul Joskow & Edward Kahn, A Quanti-
tative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in California's Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000,
ENERGY J., Oct. I, 2002, at 1, 8 [hereinafter Joskow II].
41. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 d(c) (2000) (all rates for transmission and sale of wholesale electricity must
be filed with FERC).
42. Cal. Wholesale Elec., 244 F. Supp. 2d at i074-75: see also Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1037 (not-
ing FERC approved market-based wholesale electricity sales based upon a required retail rate freeze
during the deregulation transition period and the mandatory sale of energy by WEGs through CAPX).
43. Cal. Wholesale Elec., 244 F. Supp. 2d at lO74-75: Fels, supra note 5, at 9-Io. A tariff is a le-
gally binding document (upon approval) filed by a regulated firm with its regulatory agency, setting
forth prices and policies the firm offers to its customers. See Cost Mgmt. Servs. Inc. v. Wash. Natural
Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937, 940 n.i (9th Cir. 1996).
44- Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.




C. INDICATIONS OF MARKET POWER ABUSE BY WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY
GENERATORS IN CALIFORNIA'S DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKET
Even before the crisis ended, commentators pointed to numerous
causes to explain the significant increases in electricity prices. This Note
focuses on one of those factors: the allegation that WEGs with significant
market power conspired to increase prices by limiting their electrical
generation output. The potential for manipulation initially appears be-
cause electricity markets are particularly prone to market power abuse.4"
Electricity cannot be stored, substantial entry barriers exist in the market
(which results in a fixed number of generating plants), and consumers are
reluctant to cut their power usage in response to price increases.49 Thus,
"small supply decreases can cause very large price increases; so each en-
tity with significant market share has an incentive to unilaterally raise
market prices by restricting its own output."5 When multiple firms col-
lude to restrict output, prices increase even higher.5 '
Following an investigation into the crisis, FERC released a report
stating "market manipulations contributed significantly" to price in-
creases during the crisis.52 The report included examples of two WEGs
47. Other commentators have suggested California's deregulation process resulted in flawed
market rules which then caused the crisis. One of the obvious flaws was the preservation of price caps
upon retail sales and the removal of caps from wholesale sales. When wholesale prices exceeded the
retail price caps, PG&E and SDG&E suffered millions of dollars in losses by selling electricity for less
than it cost to purchase it. See Rossi, supra note 3, at 1778. FERC noted in a November i, 20oo report
California's new electricity market structure was "seriously flawed" and had "caused, and continue[s]
to have the potential to cause, unjust and unreasonable rates for short-term energy... under certain
conditions." Fels, supra note 5, at 13 (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 93 F.E.R.C. IT 61,121,
61,349-50 (2000)). Several scholars have also explored the impact of the flawed market rules upon the
crisis. See, e.g., Joskow I, supra note 6, at 369-70 (concluding California's deregulation resulted in "the
most complicated set of wholesale electricity market institutions ever created on earth and with which
there was no real-world experience"); Rossi, supra note 3, at 2 (noting "wrong-headed deregulation
policies contributed to California's crisis"); Michael A. Yuffee, California's Electricity Crisis: How Best
to Respond to the "Perfect Storm", 22 ENERGY L.J. 65, 65 (2001) (noting FERC and CPUC have identi-
fied "significant flaws" in California's deregulation plan). Indeed, immediately after the crisis began,
several sources attributed the cause of the crisis to the deregulation process itself (i.e., "flawed market
rules"). See, e.g., CPUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 59; Rossi, supra note 3, at 1769. Blaming many of the
crisis's symptoms upon the favoring of competitive markets over government regulation, some have
called for a retreat from deregulation. See Rossi, supra note 3, at 1769.
48. See Joskow II, supra note 40, at 28-29. The California Legislature exhibited its prescience by
recognizing during the deregulation process "[t]here is a need to ensure that no participant in these
new market institutions has the ability to exercise significant market power so that operation of the
new market institutions would be distorted." AB 189o, 1996 Cal. Stat. 854, § sO.
49. See CPUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 59.




52. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION IN WESTERN MAR-
KETs: FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL MANIPULATION OF ELECTRIC AND NATURAL GAS
PRICES, Doc. No. PA02-2-ooo, at l-1 (2003) (hereinafter "FERC FACT-FINDING REPORT").
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"coordinating their efforts to manipulate western electricity prices. ' '13
The report also stated that multiple WEGs participated in trading strate-
gies designed to "game" the market and increase prices. 4 The trading
strategies, described in detail in confidential memoranda released by En-
ron Corporation,55 carried colorful names like "Ricochet," "Fat Boy,"
and "Death Star." 6 "Load Shift," a strategy which increased congestion
in electricity transmission, was especially lucrative for Enron, earning the
corporation around $30 million in profits during fiscal year 2000."7 FERC
indicated Enron was not alone in using the strategies."'
[T]he evidence indicates that Enron, on its own, could not have im-
plemented its trading strategies. It was only with the willing coopera-
tion of others that these strategies could have been executed. Through
Enron's direction, other entities both inside and outside California
made business decisions that capitalized on market conditions in an ef-
fort to maximize profits from their assets on a coordinated basis. The
coordination activity of Enron and its partners clearly changed market
outcomes in variety of ways .... Profits from this activity were typically
shared.59
Political response to the report was swift. California Senator Dianne
Feinstein called upon U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft "to investi-
gate fraud and antitrust allegations made by" California. Feinstein stated
53. Id. at VI- 55 . FERC appears to have hedged its conclusions, however, by noting the report
reflects the views of Staff only.
It has not been considered or adopted by the full Commission. In addition, whenever this
Report concludes that prices were or appear to have been manipulated, it does so in the
context of determining whether rates were unjust and unreasonable under the Federal
Power Act ....
Id. at ES-4.
54. Jonathan Peterson & Nancy Rivera Brooks, Calif. Report Widens Blame in Energy Plot, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2003, at As.
55. Memorandum from Christian Yoder & Stephen Hall, Stoel Rives LLP, to Richard Sanders,
Assistant General Counsel, Enron Corp. i (Dec. 6, 2000), available at http://news.findlaw.com
/hdocs/docs/enron/stoelrivesl2o6oomem.pdf [hereinafter Enron Memorandum].
56. "Ricochet" allowed WEGs to avoid "price caps by selling power out of state and then trading
it back in again." Peterson, supra note 54, at As. "Fat Boy" entailed a WEG informing CAISO that it
planned to use more power than it actually did, and in the process receiving extra payments. "Death
Star" created false congestion on the electrical grid, allowing WEGs to receive a premium for easing
the problem. Id.; Nancy Vogel, E-mail Suggests DWP Role in Trading Scheme, L.A. TIMES, June 23,
2002, at Bi; Enron Memorandum, supra note 55, at 4-7.
57. Enron Memorandum, supra note 55, at 5.
58. FERC FAC-FINDING REPORT, supra note 52, at VI-35 .
59. Id. at VI-43; see Peterson, supra note 54, at Ai. Indeed, the confidential memoranda expressly
noted "other market participants" were also using the strategies. Enron Memorandum, supra note 55,
November 20031
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the report "provide[s] significant evidence that there was a concerted ef-
fort to boost company profits at the expense of consumers."
6o
FERC did not specifically consider whether WEGs physically with-
held actual generation output, a tactic which would reduce the supply of
available electricity and lead to higher prices.6' California officials have
been increasingly vocal, however, in their accusations of such physical
withholding.6' For example, a CPUC report suggested California's five
largest WEGs withheld capacity during the crisis by intentionally shut-
ting down their generating plants.6 ' The report hinted the unusual num-
ber of plant outages during the crisis, well above historical averages,
showed anticompetitive motive.' The State later alleged Dynegy shut
down one of their generators "for repairs but kept it shut down after re-
pairs were completed 'to force prices up."' ' 6 California also cried con-
spiracy in allegations of collusion between Sempra Energy and Shell Oil
affiliate Coral Energy.66 Accusations of physical withholding echoed in
other sources.6 7
6o. Nancy Rivera Brooks, FERC Releases Flood of Evidence in Its Case Against Power Suppliers,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at CI.
61. FERC FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 52, at ES-2. FERC noted it would address the issue
of physical withholding separately, although it did describe one occurrence where Reliant appeared to
have physically withheld generation over a two-day period. Id. at VI-54 .
62. See David Barboza, A Big Victory by California in Energy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2002, at
C1.
63. See CPUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 44. According to CPUC, on the days when blackouts or
service interruptions occurred, thirty-seven percent to forty-six percent of the generators' capacity was
either out of service or not made available. Id. at 3. Service interruptions differ from blackouts in that
certain large commercial and industrial customers agreed beforehand to limited service interruptions
in exchange for lower rates. Id. at 1. In the event CAISO had to shut off power, those customers lost
access to power for a set period of time and shut down operations for that period. Id.
64. Id. at 44. The report qualifies its conclusions by stating it "makes no finding that any of the
blackouts or service interruptions was unavoidable." Id. at 3, 20, 50 (noting the study "does not at-
tempt to answer fully the question of why, at each plant and for each hour, the generators did not gen-
erate all available power during each service interruption hour" and more investigation is required to
assess the WEG's roles in contributing to the blackouts). The five named companies also responded to
the report by stating "there were legitimate reasons for the service disruptions and that their plants
were running as hard or harder during the crisis as before or since." Broder, supra note 6, at A22.
65. Brooks, supra note 6o, at Ci.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Joskow I, supra note 6, at 381 (finding power plants had "unusually large amounts of
generating capacity ... out of service and [were] unavailable to supply electricity"); PAUL JOSKOW &
EDWARD KAHN, IDENTIFYING THE EXERCISE OF MARKET POWER: REFINING THE ESTIMATES 3 (2001) [here-
inafter JOSKOW III] (suggesting forced outages resulted from powerful "incentive to withhold" and that
"observed behavior exceeds historic outage norms"). CPUC also cited "study after study" indicating
generators used their market power to raise prices. CPUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 60 (citing three
studies). Professors Joskow and Kahn also stated only two reasons could exist for the plant shutdowns:
either "unusual operational problems" or a strategy to withhold power from the market "to increase
prices." Joskow II, supra note 40, at 3-4. Similarly, a report prepared by FERC suggested employees
of AESfWilliams improperly prolonged the shutdown of a generating plant to obtain premium pricing
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Other indications of improper manipulation appeared in adjudica-
tive settings. A FERC initial decision found that El Paso Corporation (El
Paso) unlawfully used its market power to withhold natural gas from the
California natural gas market.68 El Paso subsequently reached a $1.69 bil-
lion settlement with several western states, including California, over al-
legations of price manipulation. 9 AES/Williams paid over $400 million to
settle several civil claims of driving up prices and overcharging custom-
ers.7' FERC ordered Williams Energy Marketing & Trading of Tulsa, a
smaller energy producer, to pay CAISO $8 million in refunds for im-
properly taking generating plants off-line and artificially limiting supply."
Dynegy paid $5 million to the federal government to settle a price ma-
nipulation investigation.72 Reliant paid $13.8 million in a settlement with
FERC regarding allegations of physical withholding over a two-day pe-
riod.73 And prosecutors accused two Enron traders, Timothy Belden and
John M. Forney, of wire fraud and conspiracy charges for manipulating
electricity prices during the crisis.74
Finally, Dr. Joskow and Edward Kahn prepared several reports ana-
lyzing wholesale electricity prices during the crisis. They discovered a
significant gap between estimated competitive benchmark prices and the
actual market prices charged over the summer of 2000."s The size of the
gap was significant enough for Joskow and Kahn to suggest market ma-
nipulation influenced electricity price increases during the crisis.76
We find that [the WEGs] withheld capacity far in excess of what can be
explained by historical outage rates or demand for ancillary services.
High-cost and high-emissions units ran while more efficient units re-
mained idle. The output gap was especially large on the highest-
from CAISO. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, NON-PUBLIC APPENDIX TO ORDER DIRECTING
WILLIAMS ENERGY MARKETING & TRADING COMPANY AND AES SOUTHLAND, INC. TO SHOW CAUSE,
Doc. No. INoI-3-ooo, at 2, 9-io (2oo), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ferc/
williamsaesi I 1502osc.pdf; Toby Eckert, Details of Shutdown Allegations Revealed, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRI., Nov. 16, 2002, at Ci.
68. Pub. Util. Comm'n of State of Cal., ioo F.E.R.C. 63,041, 65,157 (2002). Generally, natural
gas and electricity markets are separate markets, but the two markets are converging within the power
industry. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 26, 36, 41. El Paso subsequently shut down its natural-gas
trading operation in November 2002, partly attributable to investigations into its trading practices.
Alexei Barrionuevo, El Paso Executive Quits Energy Firm, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at A6.
69. See El Paso Settles with California Over Gas Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at C3.
70. See Barboza, supra note 62, at Ci.
71. See Fellmeth, supra note 28, at 841.
72. Christian Berthelsen, Call for Oversight of Natural Gas, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 30, 2003, at BI.
73. See FERC FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 52, at VI- 5 4 .
74. See Barboza, supra note 62, at Ci (noting Belden pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy);
Nancy Rivera Brooks, FBI Arrests Former Enron Energy Trader, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2003, at CI (not-
ing charges against Forney).




demand days. These results are consistent with the withholding behav-
ior for strategic rather than engineering reasons that are expected
given [the WEGs'] incentives.
77
Joskow and Kahn wavered, however, on whether the WEGs con-
spired to restrict generating capacity. Circumstances suggested WEGs
cooperated in restricting output in order to cause larger increases in
prices., 8 Yet because of tight demand elasticity in electricity markets, es-
pecially when demand is high and supply is limited, an individual WEG
can cause large price increases by restricting only a small amount of ca-
pacity.79 Such unilateral behavior could lead to prices significantly above
competitive levels during high demand periods.8°
It is still unclear whether the WEGs engaged in collusive behavior to
manipulate the electricity markets, and this Note draws no conclusion as
to that fact. For purposes of discussion, however, this Note assumes such
collusive behavior did exist and could be proved in a section I action
arising from the crisis.
II. THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
Free markets are no stranger to anticompetitive manipulation by
those seeking higher profits. Long-standing policy, however, views such
conduct as contrary to basic principles of free trade and fairness to other
parties participating in the markets. Antitrust laws protect those basic
principles and would likely benefit the operation of newly deregulated
electricity markets."' Indeed, considering the developing antitrust issues
in California's deregulated electricity market, it appears some market
participants expect that protection.
77. JosKow III, supra note 67, at 2, i8. Indeed, Joskow estimated that during summer 2000, "at
least a third of the wholesale price can be attributed to market power ... after accounting for changes
in fundamental supply and demand conditions." Joskow I, supra note 6, at 381. Professor Fellmeth
estimated the total overcharges from 2000 and 2001 at $55 billion. See Fellmeth, supra note 28, at 860.
78. See Joskow II, supra note 40, at 19.
79. See Joskow I, supra note 6, at 374.
8o. See id. at 374, 381 (noting a combination of inelastic demand and tight supplies permitted
generators "to exercise market power without engaging in collusion"); JosKow III, supra note 67, at 3
n.5 ("We are not saying collusion did not occur.., but only that collusion would not be necessary for
market power to be exercised.").
8i. See Bolze, supra note 12, at 8o-8i; Reynolds, supra note 12, at 13.
82. See Joskow II, supra note 40, at 28-29; Reynolds, supra note 12, at 11-12. On November 29,
2000, a San Diego superior court saw the first lawsuit filed under section i for alleged antitrust viola-
tions by the WEGs. See Fellmeth, supra note 28, at 837. California Attorney General Bill Lockyer also
filed suit, alleging violations of state antitrust laws and unfair business practice statutes. See Cal. ex rel.
Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., No. C-o2-178 7 -VRW, 2003 WL 21321243, at *4-*5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2003);
see also In re Cal. Wholesale Elec. Antitrust Litig., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1074-75 (S.D. Cal. 2003)
(considering antitrust claims arising from alleged wholesaler collusion in California electricity market).
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A. THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES BEHIND SECTION I OF THE
SHERMAN ACT
3
Couched in broad terms, section i declares in pertinent part: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." ' Section i prohibits only unreasonable
restraints of trade.s' Specific types of unreasonable restraints are dis-
cussed below in Part II.B.
Congress considered numerous policies in enacting the Sherman
Act. Paramount above them all is the protection of competition." "Anti-
trust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is
to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. ',8' The Act re-
lies upon the premise that free competition yields the best prices, quality,
allocation of economic resources, and the greatest progress, while pre-
serving an "environment conducive to the preservation of democratic po-
litical and social institutions. '' 88
In conjunction with the Clayton Act, both individuals and govern-
mental entities can bring actions under the Sherman Act. The Depart-
83. See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2003). Another oft-used provision within the Sherman
Act is section 2, which proscribes the exercise of actual monopoly power or the attempted use of mo-
nopoly power. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2003). A monopoly or attempted monopolization claim
brought under section 2, however, requires the defendant to possess a significant market share, gener-
ally within the range of seventy percent to ninety percent. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). The five major WEGs in California, however, held a combined mar-
ket share of anywhere from thirty-eight percent to forty-four percent. See CPUC REPORT, supra note 2,
at 8 n. i. That combined market share is insufficient to establish a monopoly or attempted monopoliza-
tion claim under section 2, much less the lower individual market shares of each WEG. Thus, this Note
focuses solely upon application of section i.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (20o3). Congress purposefully used broad language to enable the courts to adapt
section I to changed conditions and economic evolution. By conferring such a broad mandate, courts
can draw upon lessons of accumulated experience and common-law tradition in interpreting section i.
See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof*I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); United States v. E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386 (1956); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489
(194o) ("[i]n consequence of the vagueness of its language, perhaps not uncalculated, the courts have
been left to give content to the statute...") (footnote omitted).
85. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. , 59-61 (191 I).
86. See, e.g., Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975); Standard Oil Co. v. Fed.
Trade Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (195).
87. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 6io (1972).
88. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 4 (1958); Bolze, supra note 12, at 82
(antitrust policy assumes "free market forces and competition will maximize the wealth of the nation
as a whole."); cf. Nat'l Socy of Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692, 695 (subject to exceptions defined by
statute, public interest always favors competition, and "the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the
question whether competition is good or bad.").
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ment of Justice (DOJ) generally enforces criminal violations of section I,
which are considered felonies and can include fines up to $350,000 for
individuals or $io million for corporations, and prison terms for indi-
viduals for up to three years.
The primary deterrent force behind section I is the treble damages
civil action brought by private individuals. Any person (including a cor-
poration) ' who has been injured in its "business or property" by reason
of an antitrust violation can pursue a civil claim and recover treble dam-
ages, the costs of the lawsuit, and attorney's fees. 9' This provision is one
of the chief tools in encouraging antitrust enforcement and serves as "a
crucial deterrent to potential violators."92 "The purposes of the antitrust
laws are best served by insuring that the private [treble damages] action
will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business
behavior in violation of the antitrust laws."'93
B. PRICE-FIXING AND "PER SE" ILLEGALITY
Section I proscribes certain types of restraints as presumptively un-
reasonable if the "practice facially appears to be one that would always
or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output." 94
Such restraints, considered "per se" illegal, automatically violate section
i, assuming its jurisdictional boundaries are met.95 The U.S. Supreme
Court has long considered price-fixing agreements between competitors
(i.e., horizontal price-fixing) to be per se illegal.96 Even indirect horizon-
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4 (2000). For example, two vitamin supplement manufacturers accused of
criminal price fixing under section I settled with the DOJ and agreed to pay $750 million in penalties.
Additional civil claims against four other vitamin manufacturers pushed the total penalty award to
$i.i billion. See Bolze, supra note 12, at 85 n.34 (citing United States v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd.,
No. 9 9 -CR-I84 -R (N.D. Tex. May 20, i99) (settling for $5o0 million); United States v. BASF AG,
No. 99-CR-2oo-R (N.D. Tex. May 20, 1999) (settling for $250 million)).
90. A "person" can include corporations, individuals, partnerships, or states. See 15 U.S.C. § 12
(2000); 2 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 10.021I] (2d ed.
2002).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
92. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,635 (1985).
93. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968), overruled on other
grounds in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 134 (1984); see 111. Brick Co. v.
Ill., 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) (stating Congress had a legislative purpose of creating a group of "private
attorneys general" in establishing the private treble damages action); Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P.
Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821,826 (2d Cir. 1968).
94. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. i, 19-20 (979).
95. See 2 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 90, § 2.02[2][b]. Besides the per se rule, another evaluative
method exists, termed the "rule of reason," in which courts will evaluate the specific circumstances of
the dispute to determine whether the restraint promotes or suppresses competition. See Nat'l Soc'y of
Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691-92 (1978). Unlike the per se rule, analysis under the
rule of reason does not automatically presume the restraint violates section i. Id.
96. 2 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 9o, § 2.0212][b][i].
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tal price-fixing, such as an agreement between competitors to restrict
output, falls within the per se proscription.97
A violation of section I requires three elements: (i) a contract, com-
bination, or conspiracy (i.e., concerted activity between two or more ac-
tors); (2) which is an unreasonable restraint on trade; and (3) which
affects interstate or foreign commerce. 9
Unilateral conduct by one party cannot violate section I. This results
because unilateral conduct has a distinguishable economic effect from
collusive anticompetitive conduct.9 Collusive conduct between two or
more actors generally poses a greater danger to competition than a single
actor's unilateral anticompetitive conduct.'" Thus, a party bringing a sec-
tion i action against the WEGs who operated in California during the
crisis would need to produce evidence that the WEGs colluded to ma-
nipulate electricity prices. While the publicly available indications of
anticompetitive conduct may be a starting point, it is likely that more
would be required.
The doctrine of conscious parallelism, used to show an agreement
through evidence of a course of dealing or patterns of uniform business
behavior by multiple parties, may arise in a section I action arising from
the crisis.'"' Reports suggested several of the WEGs appeared to partici-
pate in similar courses of dealing by withholding output during the cri-
sis.' 2 Further, shared use of the gaming strategies also suggests uniform
behavior."° And as the WEGs sold most of their wholesale electricity
through CAPX, they could easily coordinate a reduced supply in order to
increase and stabilize the price of electricity. 4 Conscious parallelism by
97. Id. § 2.03[2][b][ii].
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); 2 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note go, § 2.02. It is unlikely the third ele-
ment would be disputed in a section i action related to the crisis. The WEGs largely involved in the
crisis are "mostly Texas-based firms with interstate operations." Fellmeth, supra note 28, at 835. Fur-
ther, the test to establish an effect on interstate commerce is extremely relaxed under section i. See
Summit Health v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 330-33 (i99I) (finding effect on interstate commerce where
the plaintiff, an ophthalmologist in Los Angeles, was injured by a group boycott of the defendant, a
hospital in Los Angeles, because the result of the boycott, by removing ophthalmological services in
Los Angeles, would also have an eventual resulting effect on interstate commerce). Thus, this Note
will not discuss the interstate commerce element.
99. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 467 U.S. 752, 774-75 (1984); see 2 VON KALI-
NOWSKI, supra note 90, § 2.02[1] (stating Congress required concerted activity to avoid dampening
competition by individual enterprises).
ioo. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761-62 (1984); see 2 VON KALINOWSKI,
supra note 90, § 2.02[I][a][i].
Iot. See 2 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 9o , § 2.02[I][b][i].
102. See supra Part I.C.
103. See id.
io4. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d ioi6, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2002); CPUC RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 62; JosKow III, supra note 67, at i8.
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itself, however, is insufficient to establish concerted action."5 Courts gen-
erally require certain "plus" factors, such as a lack of valid business justi-
fication for a party's behavior or evidence of meetings between the
parties."
As noted in Part I.C., it is unclear whether the WEGs conspired to
manipulate the electricity markets. For purposes of further discussion,
this Note will assume such a conspiracy did exist.
Turning to the unreasonable restraint element, the paradigm case
involving section I and per se unreasonable price-fixing restraints is
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.' 7 There, the respondents
(twelve corporations and five individuals) were convicted for criminal
section I violations for conspirinu to raise and maintain gasoline prices
by buying up "distress" gasoline" on the spot markets"'° and eliminating
it as a market factor."0 Assuming no change in demand, limiting the sup-
ply of distress gasoline on the spot market would result in an increase in
the price of normal gasoline."'
Evidence of the conspiracy between the respondents consisted of
testimony and numerous exhibits showing agreements between the par-
ties to manipulate the market."' In response to several of the respon-
dent's arguments, the U.S. Supreme Court held: (I) the output
restrictions were still illegal even if they were not the sole cause of the in-
crease in prices;"3 (2) even though competition continued to exist within
the affected market, the output restrictions still clearly curtailed its op-
eration;"4 and (3) a price-fixing conspiracy was actionable under section
I even if it did not result in a fixed and uniform price."'
This led to the Court's seminal recitation of the rule against horizon-
tal price-fixing agreements: "Under the Sherman Act a combination
105. Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (i954).
io6. In the absence of direct guidance by the U.S. Supreme Court, lower courts developed a sys-
tem of requiring the "plus" factors in addition to conscious parallelism to establish proof of concerted
activity. See 2 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 9o, § 2.02[I][b][i]; see also Bolze, supra note 12, at 88 (list-
ing certain factors).
107. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
io8. Different from normal gasoline, which was produced and sold by the respondents, "distress"
gasoline could not be stored, had no regular sales outlet, and was sold at prices significantly below
normal gasoline. Id. at 171.
io9. A spot market is one in which shipment of purchased goods is made in the immediate future.
Id. at 193.
ito. Id. at 166-67.
iii. Id. at 190-192, 216.
112. Id. at 177.
113. Id. at 219-220.
114. Id. at 220.
115. Id. at 222.
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formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign
commerce is illegal per se."" 6 Holding the respondents had formed such a
conspiracy, the Court affirmed their convictions under section i."'
Regarding the California crisis, assuming the WEGs agreed to
physically withhold generation capacity from the wholesale electricity
market, or engaged in gaming strategies which increased congestion
within the transmission networks, the WEGs likely restricted the electric-
ity supply available to the market." 8 Such a scenario harkens back to So-
cony-Vacuum. While other factors likely contributed to the price
increases during the crisis, one source indicated at least one-third of the
increase was attributable to alleged price manipulations by the WEGs."9
Further, even a small decrease of supply in the heavy-demand electricity
market would inexorably cause prices to increase.'20 Such an interruption
of "the play of the forces of supply and demand,' .... through the use of an
intentional price-fixing scheme, would fall within section i."
A violation of section i would expose the offending WEGs to severe
criminal and civil liability. Any criminal sanctions would pale in compari-
son with the potential civil liability the WEGs could face. One estimate
placed total overcharges from the California crisis at $55 billion dollars.' 3
Assuming that figure as true and directly related to a price-fixing agree-
ment, the treble damages provision alone would subject the WEGs to
civil liability of $165 billion dollars.'24
116. Id. at 223. The Court also noted that under traditional price-fixing arrangements, where the
defendant sets a uniform price, a combination must have the power to fix prices by controlling a "sub-
stantial part of the commerce" in the commodity. Id. Yet when a combination uses a different mecha-
nism, such as by limiting the supply of the commodity to the market, "such power [to fix prices] may
be found to exist though the combination does not control a substantial part of the commodity." Id. at
223-24. Applying that rule to the California crisis, the five WEGs controlled approximately thirty-
eight percent of the generating capacity in areas controlled by CAISO. See CPUC REPORT, supra note
2. at 9. Even though far below the eighty-two percent market control seen in United States v. Trenton
Potteries, Co., 273 U.S. 392, 394 (1927), the wholesale generator likely had power to fix prices through
the use of output limitations, and as noted by Professor Joskow, appeared to affect a substantial part
of the commerce in electricity through those output limitations. See Joskow II, supra note 40, at 16;
JOSKOW II1, supra note 67, at 18.
117. See Socony- Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 254.
I18. See supra Part I.C.
i19. See Joskow I, supra note 6, at 35.
i20. See id. at 22-23, 35.
121. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 220.
122. Id. at 222-23.
123. Fellmeth, supra note 28, at 86o.
t24. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (20oo). The $165 billion does not account for costs or attorneys' fees, both
of which would also be recoverable. While the size of the figure may raise some concerns as to the
manageability of the actions or the possibility of recovery, one court recently affirmed class certifica-




The U.S. Supreme Court has been historically reluctant to ascribe
immunities to the Sherman Act, primarily because of its importance in
protecting competitive markets. Even in regulated, non-competitive
markets, the Court generally only allows an antitrust immunity where
Congress is express in its intent to supersede the antitrust laws through
regulation.'25
The electricity industry generally enjoys no exception from that pol-
icy. ' For example, in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, the peti-
tioner, an electric utility company, appealed a finding it had violated
section two of the Sherman Act for improperly using its market power by
refusing to "wheel" power through its own transmission system to a mu-
nicipal system.' 7 The Court rejected the argument that the petitioner was
immune from antitrust prosecution because of the Federal Power Com-
mission's (FPC) regulation of the electricity industry. It reasoned that
FPC's authority to compel power interconnections arose from standards
only loosely related to antitrust considerations."s Finding no express
congressional intent to immunize electric power companies, the Court
instead observed the Federal Power Act indicates an overriding policy of
maintaining competition to the maximum extent possible consistent with
the public interest. 9
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 147 (2d Cir. 2ooi), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 917
(2002).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963) ("Repeals of the anti-
trust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only been found
in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.") (citations omitted).
126. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,374-75 (t973).
It is clear, then, that Congress rejected a pervasive regulatory scheme for controlling the in-
terstate distribution of power in favor of voluntary commercial relationships. When these
relationships are governed in the first instance by business judgment and not regulatory co-
ercion, courts must be hesitant to conclude that Congress intended to override the funda-
mental national policies embodied in the antitrust laws.
Id. at 374. The electric industry, regulated by FERC pursuant to the Federal Power Act, received no
express antitrust immunity from Congress. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2000); 2 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note
90, § 7 .o7 [I][b][ii], [2][a]. Indeed, the Federal Power Act contains a "savings clause," stating:
"[s]ections 82 4 i, 824 j, 8241, 824m of this title, and this section, shall not be construed to modify, impair,
or supersede the antitrust laws." 16 U.S.C. § 824k(e)(2). Yet sections 824d and 824e are the portions of
the Act which grant FERC the ability to review and fix electricity rates according to their "just and
reasonable" standard, and they were not included within that savings clause. See i6 U.S.C. §§ 824d,
824e, 824k(e)(2); In re Cal. Wholesale Elec. Antitrust Litig., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1084 (S.D. Cal.
2003) (in antitrust case arising from the crisis, dismissing the plaintiff's argument the savings clause
also applied to §§ 82 4 d-824e).
127. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 368.
128. Id. at 373.
129. Id. at 373-74.
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Nevertheless, three immunities will likely appear in private section i
actions arising from the crisis. The first, the indirect purchaser doctrine,
may limit the particular parties able to bring a private civil section i ac-
tion. The second, the state action doctrine, does not appear to apply due
to the deregulated nature of the electricity markets. The third, the filed
rate doctrine, presents formidable obstacles to civil enforcement and will
likely bar all private party civil section i actions against the WEGs. Be-
cause of the minor nature of the first two immunities, this Note analyzes
them briefly, but provides a more comprehensive discussion of the filed
rate doctrine.
i. The Indirect Purchaser Doctrine
The indirect purchaser doctrine limits the particular parties who can
bring a private civil section i action. The doctrine distinguishes between
two types of parties: direct and indirect purchasers. The party purchasing
the commodity directly from the alleged antitrust violator is the "direct"
purchaser, while every other party further down the distribution chain,
such as a consumer who repurchases the commodity, is an "indirect"
purchaser. 3 Under the doctrine, an indirect purchaser lacks standing to
bring a private civil section i action.3 '
The doctrine nullifies two types of arguments. Under an "offensive
use" argument, an indirect purchaser plaintiff claims injury based upon
overcharges "passed on" by the direct purchaser. While an overcharge
resulting from an antitrust violation would naturally go first to the direct
purchaser, the direct purchaser might then "pass on" all or part of the
cost of the overcharge to its customers, the indirect purchasers.'32 On the
other hand, "defensive use" of the doctrine "involves attempts by defen-
dant antitrust violators to show that plaintiff direct purchasers were not
injured because the direct purchasers had passed on the overcharge to
their customers."'33 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected both types of ar-
guments, holding the direct purchaser suffers the full extent of the de-
130. See 2 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 90, § 10.02[2][c]. For example, take a price-fixing scenario
with a three-link distribution chain, including a wholesaler (the price fixer), the retailer (the direct
purchaser), and the consumer (the indirect purchaser). The wholesaler engages in price fixing, increas-
ing the price of the commodity. The retailer pays the higher prices for the commodity, but will likely
"pass on" some or all of those costs to the consumer when he resells the commodity. As can be seen, a
single antitrust violation often has a "ripple" effect in those affected by an antitrust violation. See id.;
Howard Benjamin Green, Note. State Indirect Purchaser Statutes: The Preemptive Power of Illinois
Brick, 62 B.U. L. REV. 1241, 1245 (1982).
131. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Ill., 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977).




fendant's overcharge, regardless of any overcharges "passed on" to con-
sumers or other parties.'34
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court explained
the reasoning behind the doctrine. First, denying standing to indirect
purchasers prevents the risk of exposing antitrust defendants to multiple
liability and allowing duplicative recoveries.'3 5 For example, the direct
purchaser could recover treble damages for the full overcharge suffered,
and the indirect purchaser could also recover treble damages for any por-
tion of the overcharge passed on to it.'36 Second, the Court noted the ex-
treme difficulties inherent in calculating damages for indirect purchaser
suits.'37 That burden could decrease the effectiveness of treble damages
deterrence.' 3t Third, as the Court barred defensive use of the doctrine ten
years earlier in Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Machine Corp., it
wanted to ensure the doctrine applied equally to both plaintiffs and de-
fendants.'39 It could only do this by either extending the doctrine, or by
overruling Hanover Shoe. Relying on stare decisis, it chose the former.'40
In the California electricity markets, a three-link distribution chain
existed. The WEGs generated the wholesale electricity, then sold it to
the IOUs, who resold it to retail customers.' The IOUs purchasing the
wholesale electricity were the direct purchasers, while retail customers
were the indirect purchasers.
Pursuant to the doctrine, the IOUs, as direct purchasers, would be
the only parties with standing to pursue a private section I action against
the WEGs.'42 The doctrine would preclude indirect purchasers, such as
retail consumers who paid higher retail electricity prices, from bringing
such actions.'43
134. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968); see Green, supra
note 13o, at 1247.
135. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730-31.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 731-32.
138. Id. at 741, 745.
139. Id. at 728.
140. Id. at 736 ("[W]e must bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the
area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legis-
lation.").
141. Id. at 726.




2. The State Action Doctrine
In Parker v. Brown," the U.S. Supreme Court established that the
Sherman Act only prohibits individual action, "not state action."'45
There, the Court held section i did not apply to a state-controlled raisin
marketing program because the State had adopted and enforced the pro-
gram.' 46 Although it based its decision on state sovereignty,'47 the Court
warned a state cannot automatically "give immunity to those who violate
the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that
their action is lawful ....
Building upon that warning language, the Court in California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.'49 set forth a two-element
test to allow a private party immunity under the doctrine:
First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and af-
firmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'ac-
tively supervised' by the State itself .... It is not enough that
anticompetitive conduct is prompted by state action; rather, anticom-
petitive activities must be compelled by direction of the State acting as
a sovereign.'9'
In Midcal, a California statute mandated resale price maintenance'5'
within the wine production industry.'52 Although the statute required
144. 317 U.S. 341 , 352 (1943).
145. Id. at 350-52.
146. Id. at 344-46.352.
147. The Court reasoned that because the Sherman Act contained no language expressing a con-
gressional purpose to override state sovereignty, it would not lightly attribute to Congress "an unex-
pressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents." Id. at 351; see 2 VON
KALINOWSKI, supra note 9o , § 6.02[I] (observing state action doctrine "was limited by principles of fed-
eralism and state sovereignty stemming from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution") (footnote
omitted); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713,
713-14 (1986) (noting when state or local regulatory policy conflicts with federal antitrust policy, the
conflict poses an issue of federalism).
148. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
149. 445 U.S. 97, 104-o5 (980).
15o. Id. (citation omitted). Generally, a state policy is "clearly articulated" if the State clearly in-
tended to displace competition in a particular industry with a regulatory structure. See 2 VON KAL-
NOWSKI, supra note go , § 6.02[3 ] . Several courts of appeals use a "foreseeability standard" which
determines that "conduct is immunized if it is the foreseeable result of state agency action and if cir-
cumstances justify an inference that the Agency intended to authorize the conduct." See id. The "ac-
tive supervision" prong ensures the State retains ultimate control over the conduct of private parties,
including the authority to disapprove that conduct if it should offend the state policy. See Patrick v.
Burget, 486 U.S. 94, tOt (1988). "Absent such a program of supervision, there is no realistic assurance
that a private party's anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the party's
individual interests." Id.
15I. Resale price maintenance is a type of price fixing which is generally per se illegal under sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 102; Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
CO., 220 U.S. 373, 407 (191 ).
152. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 102.
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wine producers to sell only according to price schedules filed with the
State,53 the State maintained no direct control over the wine prices nor
reviewed "the reasonableness of the prices set by [the] wine dealers."'54
The Court determined the statute satisfied the first element of the test
because the legislative history of the statute clearly stated "its purpose to
permit resale price maintenance."'55 The second element failed, however,
because while the State authorized the price-setting and enforced the
prices set by private parties, it did not establish the prices or review their
reasonableness. 6 "The national policy in favor of competition cannot be
thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.""'
It is highly unlikely that any WEG that engaged in anticompetitive
conduct in California's electricity markets could satisfy either element of
the Midcal test.'58 While California clearly articulated its policy to transi-
tion its highly regulated electricity market into a deregulated, competi-
tive market, it did not intend to "displace competition" in the electricity
industry with a regulatory structure. To the contrary, it intended to dis-
place a regulatory structure and replace it with competition.'59 Further,
unlike the raisin program in Parker, where the State adopted and en-
forced the program in furtherance of a recognized governmental policy,
California did not adopt or enforce any anticompetitive behavior by the
WEGs."'6 Nor would such behavior comport with state policy, which
clearly favored competition. 
6,
Second, California could not have "actively supervised" any anti-
competitive conduct by the WEGs.'62 Obviously, the State did not estab-
lish or review any prices resulting from such conduct. 6, Indeed,
California now seeks $8.9 billion from the WEGs for allegedly engaging
153. Id. at 99.
154. Id. at too.
155. Id. at IO5.
156. Id. at lo6.
157. Id.
158. See Rossi, supra note 3, at 1788 (encouraging courts to be cautious of applying state action
doctrine to newly deregulated electric industries); Schwartz, supra note I9, at 1487 (noting that a legis-
lative policy advocating deregulated, competitive markets removes the "clearly articulated ... policy"
of regulation historically common in electricity industry).
159. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
16o. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (943).
161. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1487.
62. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
163. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at io5-o6.
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in such conduct.6 4 Accordingly, the state action doctrine will not immu-
nize the WEGs from private civil section I claims by the IOUs.6 '
3. The Filed Rate Doctrine
Unlike the relatively simple application of the two immunities previ-
ously discussed, the filed rate doctrine presents more nuanced considera-
tions. The resolution of its application to the crisis is of vital concern, as
the effect of the doctrine can bar all private civil section I actions against
the WEGs.
In antitrust actions, the filed rate doctrine immunizes a defendant
from private party section I actions when a plaintiff predicates the action
upon a rate submitted to and approved by a regulatory agency. '66 Federal
courts have applied the doctrine for rates approved by multiple federal
agencies, including FERC.'67 And the doctrine still applies even if the
filed rates resulted from a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of section
168I.
a. Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.
The filed rate doctrine first appeared in an antitrust setting in Keogh
v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.'6 There, the petitioner, a manu-
facturer of excelsior and flax tow, alleged the respondents, a group of in-
terstate freight carriers, formed a conspiracy to eliminate competition in
interstate freight rates in violation of section I. The petitioner, seeking
treble damages, argued the conspiracy resulted in higher rates than those
possible through free competition. The respondents, however, had filed
the rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which ap-
proved the rates. 7°
164 See supra note Io and infra note 255 and accompanying text.
165. See Cal. v. Mirant Corp., No. C-02-1 787 -VRW, 2003 WL 21321243, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25,
2003) (ruling the state action doctrine inapplicable in antitrust suit brought against WEGs for alleged
anticompetitive conduct during the crisis).
i66. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 422 (1986); County of
Stanislaus v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., I14 F.3d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 1997). Generally, once the federal regu-
latory agency approves the rates, the doctrine becomes active. See Keogh v. Chi. & Northwestern Ry.
Co., 260 U.S. 156, 16o (1922). The doctrine also applies when rates have been filed and lawfully take
effect, even before approval. Id. However, if after the rates are filed, the Agency disapproves the rates,
the doctrine does not bar a private antitrust suit. See generally 2 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 9
o ,
§ 7.02[3][a].
167. See, e.g., Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 573 (i98I); 2 VON KALINOWSKI,supra note 9
o ,
§ 7.0[3][a].
168. See, e.g., Square D, 476 U.S. at 422; Keogh, 260 U.S. at 162; County of Stanislaus. 114 F.3d at
863; see generally Hall, 453 U.S. at 580 (1981) ("[F]iled rate doctrine applies both to federal antitrust
actions and to state law causes of action relating to rates established by federal agencies.").
169. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
170. Id. at 159-I6o.
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The Court stated the sole question for decision was whether the peti-
tioner could pursue a private civil section i action.'7 ' In determining that
the fixed rates were "reasonable and non-discriminatory," as settled and
approved by the ICC proceedings, the Court answered its question in the
negative.'72
It initially reasoned that "[a] rate is not necessarily illegal because it
is the result of a conspiracy.., in violation of the Anti-Trust Act. What
rates are legal is determined by the Act to Regulate Commerce [the
statutory provision endowing ICC with regulatory authority]." In the
event a conspiracy between the respondents resulted in unreasonably
high or discriminatory rates contrary to ICC regulations, the petitioner
had recourse to recover damages through ICC proceedings, Any addi-
tional remedy via treble damages, however, would be contrary to con-
gressional intent.'73
Second, noting the petitioner could only bring a private treble dam-
ages claim if he had been "injured in his business or property,'7 4 the
Court reasoned such an injury "implies violation of a legal right. The le-
gal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a rate are measured
by the published tariff. Unless and until suspended or set aside, this rate
is made, for all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and ship-
per."'7 5 Contract, tort, or antitrust law could not vary or enlarge those
rights. "This stringent rule prevails, because otherwise the paramount
purpose of Congress-prevention of unjust discrimination-might be de-
feated."''76 If the petitioner could recover under antitrust, he would in ef-
fect receive a rebate which might give him "preference over his trade
competitors.' 7  That preference would then negate the congressional
goal of uniform treatment because no one could reasonably expect that
"several juries and courts [would give] to each [competitor] the same
measure of relief.'
8
Third, for the petitioner to prevail, he would have to prove that the
ICC would approve a "hypothetical lower rate" (i.e., a rate resulting
from unfettered competition, rather than through conspiracy). As the
Act to Regulate Commerce had conferred upon ICC the authority to ap-
171. Id. at i61.
172. Id. at 161-62.
173. Id. at 162.
174. See 15 U.S.C. § i(a) (2000).






prove those rates, "it is [the ICC] which must determine whether a rate is
discriminatory," not the courts.'79
Finally, the Court reasoned that the petitioner's damages were
"purely speculative" and impossible to prove. Since all the shippers, in-
cluding the petitioner, had to pay the "legal rate," any advantages from a
lower rate may have passed through to the customers or the ultimate
consumer, in the form of lower prices, rather than to the petitioner or
other shippers.' Accordingly, the Court used the doctrine to dismiss the
petitioner's section I claim.'
8 '
b. Square D Co. v. Niagra Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc.
From its beginning, Keogh has suffered from extensive criticism. Its
immunizing effect from treble damages runs contrary to the "private at-
torney general" policy behind antitrust enforcement'82 and its existence
stands as a rare exception to the U.S. Supreme Court's hesitation to
override jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.' Indeed, numerous sources
have referred to the Keogh holding as "unwise" and poorly reasoned."'
In 1986, that criticism came to a head when the U.S. Supreme Court
considered whether to overrule Keogh. In Square D v. Niagara Frontier
Tariff Bureau, Inc., the petitioners, a group of commercial shippers, al-
leged that the respondent motor carriers had illegally fixed freight trans-
portation rates contrary to section I. '8' Among other remedies, the
petitioners sought treble damages.'6 The respondents argued that since
they filed their rates with the ICC, the filed rate doctrine barred the peti-
tioner's claim.' 8 The Court agreed and ruled Keogh controlled the case
before it."8
"The question, then, is whether we should continue to respect the
rule of Keogh."'89 In responding to the petitioners' argument that the pri-
vate treble damages action promotes competition and free markets, the
179. Id. at 164.
18o. Id. at 164-65.
I8I. Id. at I65.
182. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
183. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,374-75 (1973).
184. See, e.g., Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau Inc., 476 U S. 409, 419-20 (1986)
(stating Keogh "was unwise as a matter of policy"); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 19.6, at 660 (1994) ("None of [Keogh's] arguments had
much to be said for them at the time they were originally made, and they are even less sensible to-
day.").
L85. 476 U.S. at 410.
186. Id. at 413.
187. Id. at 414.




Court agreed, even indicating Keogh "was unwise as a matter of policy."
Nevertheless, the Court presumed Congress was "fully cognizant of this
interpretation of the statutory scheme, which had been a significant part
of our settled law for over half a century, and that Congress did not see
fit to change it when Congress carefully reexamined this area of the law
in I98o. ' ' '9
Responding to past criticism directed at Keogh, comprehensively
discussed in the lower court of appeals,'9 ' the Court stated:
[I]t is also true that the Keogh rule has been an established guidepost
at the intersection of the antitrust and interstate commerce statutory
regimes for some 6 decades. The emergence of subsequent proce-
dural and judicial developments does not minimize Keogh's role as an
essential element of the settled legal context in which Congress has re-
peatedly acted in this area...."'
Thus, because of "careful, intense, and sustained congressional at-
tention," the Court concluded that "[i]f there is to be an overruling of the
Keogh rule, it must come from Congress, rather than from this Court."'93
c. FERC-Approved Rates and Market-Based Rates
Courts have applied the filed rate doctrine to rates approved by
FERC and also appear to have extended the doctrine to encompass mar-
ket-based rates, rather than just fixed, cost-of-service rates. For example,
in County of Stanislaus v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., the petitioners,
seeking treble damages, alleged the respondents engaged in a price-fixing
conspiracy in violation of section I by inflating the rates of natural gas
above the prevailing market rate." The rates at issue, however, had been
filed and approved both by the Economic Regulatory Administration
(ERA)'95 and FERC., 6 The "filed rate" reviewed by FERC was the pre-
vailing market rate, apparently determined through two methods of price
19o. Id. at 419-20 (footnote omitted).
191. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 76o F.2d 1347, 1352-56 (2nd Cir.
1985), affd, 476 U.S. 409 (1986). In the court of appeals opinion for Square D, Judge Friendly com-
prehensively summarized the criticism directed at Keogh, and this section of the Note incorporates
many of the opinion's arguments. Indeed, in the lone dissent in the U.S. Supreme Court opinion for
Square D, Justice Marshall stated: "Judge Friendly cogently and comprehensively explained why the
reasoning of [Keogh] has been rendered obsolete by subsequent developments in the law.... I am
persuaded by his analysis. I therefore dissent." Square D, 476 U.S. at 424-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192. Square D, 476 U.S. at 423-424.
193. Id. at 424.
194. 114 F.3d 85 8, 86o (9th Cir. 1977).
195. Id. Like FERC, ERA is also a federal administrative agency.
196. Id. at 861. Similar to its authority over electricity rates, FERC has authority under the Natural
Gas Act to ensure all gas rates are just and reasonable, 15 U.S.C. § 717(c)(a) (2oo0), and to fix a just
and reasonable rate if it should find such rate to be unjust or unreasonable. 15 U.S.C. § 717d (2ooo).
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calculation.'97 Yet the court noted ERA did not review and approve a
fixed rate; instead, it reviewed and approved a volume quantity of natu-
ral gas imported by the respondents. The court determined the respon-
dent's "import practices," reviewed and approved by ERA, were a "filed
rate" for purposes of the filed rate doctrine. I 8 Since the doctrine encom-
passed that "filed rate," the court applied the doctrine and dismissed the
action."
Similarly, in Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, a non-
antitrust case, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a FERC-ordered allo-
cation of power as a legitimate "filed rate."2" Stating that "the right to a
reasonable rate is the right to the rate which [FERC] files or fixes," .... the
Court held the lower court's ruling that the petitioner "had purchased an
unreasonably large quantity of high-cost power... conflicts with FERC's
orders in the same manner as would a refusal to recognize a FERC-
approved price as a reasonable cost.... .... Accordingly, the doctrine
states that federal and state courts cannot determine that any other spe-
cific rate or approved ratemaking process, both considered "filed rates,"
is more reasonable than the rate approved by a federal agency."°
d. The Filed Rate Doctrine and the California Crisis
Assuming the WEGs participated in anticompetitive conduct in vio-
lation of section i, it appears the U.S. Supreme Court's deference to the
filed rate doctrine will lead to its application to related private section i
actions, thus barring any treble damages claims brought by the IOUs. 4
197. County ofStanislaus, 114 F.3d at 86o n.i.
198. Id. at 864.
199. Id. at 863. 867 (citing Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 422
(1986)).
200. 476 U.S. 953, 966 (I986).
201. Id. at 963 (quoting Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246,
251-52 (1951)).
202. Id. at 973; see Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 897 F.2d 570,
578 (D.C. Cir. 199o) (FERC "need not confine rates to specific, absolute numbers but may approve a
tariff containing a rate 'formula' or a rate 'rule'....")
203. See Nantahala Power & Light, 476 U.S. at 963, 973; see also In re Cal. Wholesale Elec. Anti-
trust Litig., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1077-78 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (finding the FERC-approved market struc-
ture operated by CAPX and CAISO fits within the filed rate doctrine); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lynch,
216 F. Supp. 2d, 1o16, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding broad interpretation of "filed rate" warranted
applying doctrine to FERC-approved "rates" based on market-based rather than fixed, cost-of-service
processes); Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2001)
(noting that the "filed rate" definition includes block-forward contracts administered by CAPX and
subject to CAPX tariffs).
204. As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Square D, the filed rate doctrine does not bar anti-
trust scrutiny by the Government for possible criminal sanctions under section i. Square D Co. v. Ni-
agara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 422 (1986). Yet this ignores the substantial deterrent
effect of the private treble damages claim. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, several convincing arguments exist which may militate
against application of the doctrine to actions arising from the crisis. The
doctrine has an extremely poor fit to the facts of the crisis, and as noted,
suffers from extensive criticism. Even though Square D rejected that
criticism, the Court did not face the doctrine's effect within a deregulated
industry, nor foresee the mischief the doctrine could cause in a scenario
similar to the California crisis. Indeed, application of the doctrine to the
novel and unique nature of the deregulated California electricity markets
appears to require a significant broadening of the doctrine, a measure
which appears unwise considering the criticism surrounding the doctrine,
its poor fit to the crisis, and the need for proper remedies for any anti-
competitive conduct committed during the crisis.
In any private section i action arising from the crisis, the WEGs are
likely to contend the rate tariffs they filed with FERC are "filed rates....5
The rate tariffs, however, were not fixed, uniform rates, such as "cost-of-
service" rates.2°6 Instead, they were "market-based" tariffs, consisting of
applications by the WEGs setting forth the process for them to sell elec-
tricity in California at wholesale rates. 7 These "market-based" tariffs
were new to FERC and dramatically different from the fixed "cost-of-
service" tariffs with which FERC had the most experiencee Indeed,
FERC's cursory analysis of these new tariffs hints at the Agency's inex-
perience; it analyzed these applications solely by looking at the market
share of each WEG, and being satisfied there was insufficient market
share to manipulate the market, approved the applications.2" Unlike
"cost-of-service" rates, FERC never evaluated a fixed number under its
"just and reasonable" standard, but instead approved a process by which
the WEGs would sell wholesale electricity in California.1 0
Little practical reason exists for courts to pay deference to FERC
oversight of the market-based tariffs. FERC generally looks to whether
the tariffs are "just and reasonable," yet "market-based" tariffs have no
fixed figure to evaluate under that standard; indeed, there was little for
FERC to evaluate other than the market share of the WEG applicant.
With little to approve or examine, FERC exercised minimal agency over-
sight over the tariffs filed by the WEGs. Further, the approved "market-
based" tariffs set forth the process by which the WEGS were to sell
2o5. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
2o6. See supra notes i6-18 and accompanying text.
207. See Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1041.
2o8. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
209. See id.; Fels, supra note 5, at io.
210. See In re Cal. Wholesale Elec. Antitrust Litig., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1074-75 (S.D. Cal. 2003);
see also Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
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wholesale electricity. Assuming anticompetitive conduct by the WEGs, it
cannot be said that FERC approved such conduct. Applying the doctrine
to approval of those "market-based" tariffs would do little more than pay
lip service to the policy of agency deference.
Justice Stewart recognized in Otter Tail a major difference between
highly regulated markets and competitive markets. He stated the regula-
tion of private utility rates is necessary because of heightened market
power and monopolies present within the utility industry."' Because of
that regulation, antitrust law is ill-suited to those highly regulated indus-
tries. " ' The converse could also be true, in that antitrust law is well-suited
for deregulated electricity markets subject to competition, especially to
deter anticompetitive manipulations by market participants."3
Moreover, in not allowing a private party to recover for antitrust
violations, the doctrine ignores the difference between a "just and rea-
sonable" rate and a rate obtained through free competition. That is, a
rate may be reasonable to FERC, but may still result from a price-fixing
conspiracy, thus being higher than a rate obtainable in a free market."4
By denying antitrust recovery for a rate resulting from anticompetitive
conduct, the IOUs lose the opportunity to receive the benefit of lower
rates and are also subject to damages from incurring that higher rate.
These arguments, however, face an uphill battle. Past commentary
suggests FERC's oversight encompasses all "filed rates," regardless of
whether they are fixed rates or free-floating market-based rates.
There is no suggestion in any of the Supreme Court's decisions that the
nature of the particular federally-authorized rate (i.e., whether it be a
fixed, cost-of-service-based rate, an indexed rate, or a free-floating
market-based rate) should affect in any way the preemptive effect of
the rate once the particular form of rate structure has been approved
or accepted by the FERC.... [W]here the FERC continues to have
statutory authority over wholesale power prices, the filed rate doctrine
still applies, even though the FERC, in its exercise of that authority,
chooses to allow wholesalers to charge market-based prices." '
211. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 391 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
212. See id.
213. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 7 ("[T]he potential for a company to engage in anticom-
petitive behavior and charge excessive prices for electricity is a significant concern when rates are de-
termined by the marketplace instead of cost-of-service regulation .... ); cf. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 389
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
214. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 76o F.2d 1347, 1354 (2d Cir. 1985),
affd, 476 U.S. 409 (1986) (noting a "zone of reasonableness" exists for rates within ICC's reasonable
and non-discriminatory rates determination).
215. Fels, supra note 5, at 16-17; see Farmer's Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 734 F.2d 5486, i5oI (D.C. Cir. 1984) (FERC is not "required to adhere 'rigidly to a cost-
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The poor fit of the doctrine to the crisis provides additional reasons
for courts to hesitate to apply the doctrine, especially as its application to
the crisis does not further any of the policies enunciated in Keogh. There,
the Court first reasoned that an injured plaintiff could already recover
damages for an unreasonable rate through the authorized federal agency
and expressed concerns that allowing antitrust remedies might result in
various plaintiffs obtaining non-uniform relief from different juries.
In the crisis, the potential for duplicative recoveries does arise. The
IOUs have recourse to petition FERC to provide refunds for over-
charges resulting from the WEGs' alleged anticompetitive conduct, and
an additional antitrust action could duplicate those refunds.217 Yet that
concern ignores the power of a district court to modify a judgment to
avoid such duplication. i8 And unlike FERC, an antitrust remedy could
provide full compensation for any overcharges incurred. Because of its
legislative authority, FERC appears limited in providing a full refund for
overcharges incurred during the crisis."9 FERC also lacks the authority
to order monetary penalties against the WEGs for any anticompetitive
conduct, and any FERC-ordered remedy would likely not carry any sig-
nificant deterrent effect. Yet antitrust remedies can provide full compen-
sation for past anticompetitive conduct and, through its treble damages
provisions, deter any future misconduct. Due to the importance of that
deterrent effect, Congress has recognized that the risk of double recov-
ery should not preclude a treble damages action."'
Keogh's concern with non-uniform recoveries also does not arise
here. For example, under Keogh's logic, should an IOU receive an anti-
trust remedy, it might serve as a rebate which may give the IOU an ad-
vantage over the other IOUs."' Further, different juries may grant
varying awards to the different IOUs, thus implicating Keogh's concerns
of price discrimination.
based determination of rates."') (citation omitted); In re Cal. Wholesale Elec., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1079
("[T]he filed rate doctrine applies to bar claims challenging the rates set by FERC in a market-based
rate system."). The U.S. Supreme Court may have implicitly supported these conclusions by affirming
FERC's assertion of broadened authority through FERC Order 888, which established the basic rules
for deregulation and implementation of "unbundled" wholesale generation and local transmission
electricity distribution. See N.Y. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1, 20 (2001).
216. Keogh v. Chi. & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1992).
217. See infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
218. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Ill., 431 U.S. 720, 761-62 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting a district
court's ability to "fashion relief accordingly" to avoid duplicative recoveries).
219. See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
220. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 762 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that congressional intent shows
that where double recovery is unavoidable, liability should still be imposed).
221. See Keogh, 26o U.S. at 163.
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That argument also does not fit within the facts of the crisis. The
IOUs participated within a deregulated, competitive electricity market,
and thus paid different market rates due to the nature of the market. In
the event of a price-fixing conspiracy by the WEGs, the market rates
would be higher than those obtainable in an unfettered market, but the
IOUs all had to pay those increased prices. Further, only three major
IOUs exist within the California electricity market. 2 It would be a sim-
ple matter through joinder procedures for the IOUs to bring one anti-
trust action, resulting in one jury and avoiding the possibility of
inconsistent awards. 23
Keogh's second policy concern acknowledged the issue that in apply-
ing section I, a court would have to decide upon a supposed "hypotheti-
cal lower rate" (i.e., a rate unaffected by an antitrust violation).24 That
determination supposedly risks court interference with the role previ-
ously reserved to the regulatory agency by Congress.2
Yet in section i actions arising from the crisis, a court need not de-
termine whether the hypothetical rate would fit FERC's standards; in-
stead, the court need only estimate what electricity prices would have
been absent anticompetitive conduct."6 A court would use that estimate
for calculating damages, and nothing more. Such an estimate would in-
evitably be lower, thus running little risk it might be contrary to FERC's
"just and reasonable" mandate. Even if a court had to decide whether a
rate was "just and reasonable" according to FERC's standards, the court
could still defer to congressional intent by referring such a question to
the Agency. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has engaged in similar re-
ferrals several times after Keogh."7
Keogh's third concern argued that damages claimed by a plaintiff
would be "purely speculative" and impossible to prove2 The specula-
tion would arise from a court's inability to determine whether a lower
rate would benefit a plaintiff or whether the plaintiff would pass on the
benefit of the lower rate to its customers. 9
222. See CPUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 8-9.
223. Cf Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 76o F.2d 1347, 1352 (2d Cir. 1985),
affd, 476 U.S. 409 (1986).
224. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
225. See Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163-64.
226. See IA PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 103-04 (2d ed. 2ooo).
227. See Square D, 76o F.2d at 1354 (citing three U.S. Supreme Court cases referring question of
reasonableness of tariff to ICC).




Like the others, that argument also does not fit within the facts of
the crisis. During the crisis, the IOUs could not pass on any overcharges
to their retail customers because of the retail price caps imposed upon
the electricity market by CPUC.230 Indeed, PG&E became bankrupt be-
cause it could not pass on the higher prices.23 '
Further, in Hanover Shoe, the Court rejected a similar pass-on the-
ory when raised in regard to the indirect purchaser doctrine.232 There, the
Court brushed aside Keogh's "speculative damages" argument, stating
"we ascribe no general significance to the Keogh dictum for cases where
the plaintiff is free to prove that he has been charged an illegally high
price." '33 Instead, the court required the plaintiff to prove only that the
defendant overcharged it and the amount of the overcharge.234 Whether
the plaintiff "passed on" some of the higher costs had no relevance to the
action."'
Nevertheless, it is likely that courts will apply the filed rate doctrine
to the California crisis,36 especially considering the U.S. Supreme Court's
broad deference to the doctrine in Square D. There, the Court empha-
sized the longevity of Keogh and its importance in a settled area of law. 37
"[I]t is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that
it be settled right. ' ' 3'
230. See Rossi, supra note 3, at 1778.
231. See id. at 1769.
232. 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968); see generally 2 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 90, § 7.02[2].
233. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347, 1353 (2d Cir. 1985),
affd, 476 U.S. 409 (1986) (quoting Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 491 n.8). The Court's reference to "cases
where the plaintiff is free to prove that he has been charged an illegally high price" appears to refer
back to Keogh's argument that a filed rate is the "legal rate," and an antitrust plaintiff can only chal-
lenge such a rate before the regulatory agency that reviewed it. See supra notes 174-76 and accompa-
nying text.
234. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494.
235. Id.
236. In one of the first antitrust actions resulting from alleged manipulation of California's electric-
ity market by the WEGs, a federal court held the filed rate doctrine precluded the plaintiff's claims
under the Cartwright Act (California's state antitrust law). The district court found the filed rate doc-
trine preempted California state law in this instance. In re Cal. Wholesale Elec. Antitrust Litig., 244 F.
Supp. 2d 1072, 1078 (S.D. Cal. 2003). In a similar case, the California Attorney General challenged the
application of the filed rate doctrine to antitrust claims arising from the crisis. The court rejected the
challenge, stating "it is indisputable that the well settled doctrine flows from congressional intent ... to
which courts have given effect through strict application of the doctrine. Those substantive provisions
have not been altered by Congress, and the court declines the AG's invitation to do so here." Cal. v.
Mirant Corp., No. C-o2-17 87-VRW, 2003 WL 21321243, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2003). The Attorney
General plans on appealing the ruling. Nancy Vogel, State's Energy Firm Claims Denied, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2003, at B6.




Yet the facts of the crisis also defeat any reliance upon that broad
deference. Keogh arose in an era of heavily regulated industries and
"cost-of-service" rates. Over the past twenty years, those industries have
undergone dramatic changes and have largely adopted "market-based"
rates determined by competitive forces. While application of the doctrine
to a highly regulated, "cost-of-service" industry is well-settled, its appli-
cation to a deregulated, competitive market is a more modern invention.
Due to the relative youth of deregulated industries, it does not appear as
certain that the doctrine deserves the deference paid to it by the Court.
Considering the Court's own suggestion that Keogh "was unwise as a
matter of policy," '39 extending its application to those new industries only
compounds the original error.24
Assuming, however, that courts do apply the doctrine to the Califor-
nia crisis, it would bar the IOUs from bringing private section i treble
damages actions for any overcharges suffered from anticompetitive con-
duct by the WEGs. In discussing an antitrust immunity similar to the
filed rate doctrine, Justice Blackmun's comment echoes concerns about
the dimming of antitrust enforcement in the California crisis:
But Hanover Shoe is on the books, and the Court feels that it must be
'consistent' in its application of pass-on. That, for me, is a wooden ap-
proach, and it is entirely inadequate when considered in the light of the
objectives of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.... Nevertheless, we must
now await still another statute which, as the Court acknowledges, the
Congress may adopt. One regrets that it takes so long and so much
repetitious effort to achieve, and have this Court recognize, the obvi-
ous congressional aim24'
239. See id. at 420.
240. See AREEDA, supra note 226, at io8 (stating that since the filed rate doctrine is irrational, as
conceded by the U.S. Supreme Court, "the best policy" is to construe it "narrowly").
241. Il1. Brick Co. v. Ill., 431 U.S. 720, 765-66 0977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see AREEDA, supra
note 226, at i to ("stare decisis is no reason for expanding the domain of a poor decision").
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III. INADEQUACY OF FERC AUTHORITY
As discussed, it appears that any private section i actions arising
from the crisis will fail due to the filed rate doctrine.24 Thus, FERC will
possess exclusive jurisdiction over disputes of alleged anticompetitive
conduct during the crisis, and will carry the burden of reviewing claims
and awarding appropriate remedies for such conduct. 43
Continued review of the electricity markets is a crucial matter. Even
though the crisis abated, it became evident afterward that the electricity
markets are still vulnerable to future anticompetitive manipulation." For
example, FERC recently acknowledged price manipulation continues in
the natural gas markets, which indirectly affect electricity prices.245 It is
no surprise to hear FERC admitting the energy markets require "more-
aggressive oversight. 2
46
Due to the unavailability of antitrust law, the electricity markets de-
pend upon FERC to police and remedy any anticompetitive conduct
within the markets. In terms of providing any substantive or meaning-
ful relief, however, FERC appears more fettered than formidable. While
FERC instituted several "price mitigation" measures which partly allevi-
ated the severe price fluctuations in the markets during the crisis,24s the
Agency largely played an inadequate role during the crisis. 49 This inade-
quacy flows from several holes in FERC's agency hull: insufficient legis-
lative authority; inexperience with deregulated, competitive electricity
markets; and substantial human resources problems.
242. See discussion supra Part II.C(3 ).
243. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 825e-825f (2000) (FERC may investigate and penalize unlawful conduct
upon complaint or on its own motion); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966
(1986); Fed. Power Comm'n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1964); 2 VON KALINOWSKI,
supra note 9o, § 7.06[2] (FERC generally has exclusive jurisdiction over rates).
244. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 93 F.E.R.C. If 61,12i, 61,349-50 (2000).
245. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, 2003 NATURAL GAS MARKET ASSESSMENT 25 (2002-2003);
see FERC FAcr-FINDING REPORT, supra note 52, at 111-55 (noting natural gas prices indirectly influence
electricity prices).
246. See Berthelsen,supra note 72, at Bi.
247. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 825e-825f (FERC may investigate unlawful conduct pursuant to complaint
or upon its own motion); GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 48 (FERC can set new rates and order refunds
for the amount charged in excess of the just and reasonable rate); cf Reynolds, supra note 52, at iI (in
the energy markets, FERC regulation largely took the place of competition in ensuring fairness to
consumers).
248. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 95 F.E.R.C. 1$ 61,418, 62,548-49, 62559 (2o01); San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co., 93 F.E.R.C. $ 61,294, 61,982-83 (2000).
249. See Fellmeth, supra note 28, at 864.
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FERC's congressionally mandated standard of review is whether a
rate is "just and reasonable.""25 Should it determine a rate is "unjust, un-
reasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential," then FERC can de-
termine a "just and reasonable rate" and fix it by order. 5 ' For existing
rates found to be unjust or unreasonable, FERC can order a refund for
the overcharge, that is, the difference between the FERC-set "just and
reasonable" rate and the previous unjust or unreasonable rate. The
power to order refunds, however, only arises sixty days after FERC re-
ceives a complaint or begins its own investigation into possible anticom-
petitive conduct.52
[R]efunds may only be ordered for the period following the refund 'ef-
fective date.' The earliest the refund effective date can be is sixty days
after a complaint is filed with FERC or after a notice of Commission-
initiated investigation is issued. As a result, this limitation provides no
remedy for instances where market participants have charged unjust or
unreasonable rates during the period before the refund effective
date. 5'
This restriction initially resulted in FERC suggesting any refunds
from the crisis will likely not exceed $i billion. 54 While later reports sug-
gested FERC may increase the refund amount to $3.3 billion, California
officials still complain those amounts are far short of their initial claim of
$8.9 billion.255 Taking Professor Fellmeth's estimated $55 billion in over-
charges as true,"' a refund of $3.3 billion amounts to only six percent of
the total overcharges.
FERC also lacks the authority to order monetary penalties against
WEGs who charge unjust or unreasonable rates for electricity."7 "While
this authority may not have been necessary for cost-of-service regulation,
it is important if FERC is to pose a credible threat and deter anticom-
petitive behavior or violations of market rules by market participants.",,,8
For example, in response to Enron's anticompetitive conduct during
the crisis, FERC did not levy any monetary penalties. Instead, the
250. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (20oo) ("All rates and charges.., shall be just and reasonable, and any
such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful.").
251. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2ooo).
252. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 48.
253. Id.; see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d 106, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (citing 96
F.E.R.C. 1 61,120, 61,505 (2ooi)) (noting FERC cannot order retroactive refunds).
254. See Fellmeth, supra note 28, at 849-50.
255. See Jonathan Peterson & Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Energy Markets Manipulated, Regulators
Say, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at As. Those reports suggested FERC may have found a loophole
around this restriction. See FERC FAcr-FINDING REPORT, supra note 52, at VI-Io-Ii.
256. See Fellmeth, supra, note 28, at 86o.
257. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 49.
258. Id. at 5.
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Agency stripped Enron "of their authority to sell electricity anywhere in
the United States at market rates." '259 That penalty, however, is merely
symbolic; before FERC even contemplated the penalty, Enron "sold its
energy trading business.., and does not intend to reenter that busi-
ness., ,26
Considering the absence of legislative authority to provide meaning-
ful remedies or penalties, it appears unlikely FERC will be able to ade-
quately police electricity markets in the future. As noted by the U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO):
FERC lacks adequate enforcement 'bite' to deter anticompetitive be-
havior or other violations of market rules. Such deterrence is an impor-
tant part of an effective oversight approach....
... As a result, it is difficult for FERC to curb and respond effec-
tively and firmly to anticompetitive behavior, particularly for electric-
ity markets.26
In addition, FERC lacks meaningful experience with deregulated,
competitive electricity markets due to its concentration on the highly
regulated markets of the past. FERC has yet to develop a detailed over-
sight approach to monitor deregulated electricity markets."' Its past ef-
forts in adapting to these markets has been "incomplete or of limited
effectiveness. "'6 FERC itself noted it misunderstood the level of over-
sight and investigation needed to prevent or mitigate the effects of the
Californ crisis.6 Instead, the Agency thought it could wait for the
competitive electricity market structure to be fully in place before devel-
oping effective monitoring actions.' 6' This unfortunately was not the case.
FERC's inexperience resulted in a barrage of criticism following its
response to the California crisis. CPUC claimed FERC's "[clontinued
enforcement inaction" raised questions as to FERC's commitment to the
259. Jonathan Peterson & Elizabeth Douglass, Regulators Press Energy Firms but Uphold Dis-
puted Contracts, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2003, at AI.
260. Id.
261. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 7, 48; cf id. at 78 (noting eighty-three percent of FERC em-
ployees believe FERC requires additional authority to levy penalties against market abusers).
262. See id. at 31, 5 .
263. Id. at 3 1.
264. See id. at 34. FERC officials also stated the California crisis was a "wake up call" for FERC,
and that it "ha[d] not done all that it could to oversee energy markets." Id. at 6, 38. Indeed, over fifty
percent of FERC employees believe FERC is not effective in "[d]etecting market power abuses in
wholesale electricity markets" (compared with twenty-six percent who consider FERC effective). Id.
at 75. Further, forty-four percent of FERC employees believe FERC is not effective in "[clorrecting
detected market power abuses in wholesale electricity markets (compared with thirty-five percent who
believe FERC is effective). Id.
265. See id. at 51.
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fairness and stability of California's electricity market. 66 Dr. Joskow in-
dicated both FERC and CPUC "acted too slowly and ineffectively as the
crisis deepened and spent most of their energies pointing fingers of
blame at one another rather than working together cooperatively to find
a solution. '267 Other commentators accused FERC of taking "an easygo-
ing approach toward the corporations they regulate, '268 and for not acting
as the "antitrust cop.., on the beat in the state" during the crisis.
'69
Finally, FERC's substantial human resource problems exacerbated
its inability to effectively respond to the crisis. It has encountered diffi-
culty recruiting staff "knowledgeable about competitive energy mar-
kets," largely due to competition with private sector salaries. 7 ' Indeed,
FERC currently lacks sufficient staff with the required expertise to effec-
tively oversee deregulated energy markets.2 7' A large portion of its staff
faces impending retirement, and it has replaced the head of its organiza-
tion four times over the past five years. 71 "Such a high level of leadership
turnover may have had a significant impact on the ability of the Agency
to develop a new regulatory approach for emerging energy mar-
kets .... 273
Due to these issues, FERC appears overwhelmed by the complex
pressures facing it. Those pressures likely contributed to the "lack of
consistent management and direction for the Agency" as well as the
"agency's lack of progress in developing and implementing a new regula-
tory approach for competitive energy markets" over the past five years.274
FERC continues operating under its antiquated legislative authority,
designed primarily for highly regulated, cost-of-service systems, rather
than for deregulated, market-based systems.275 Further, its inexperience
in deregulated markets, coupled with its human resources problems, sug-
gests a continuing inability to effectively police California's electricity
markets. Thus, it appears the conjunction of the filed rate doctrine and
FERC's inadequacy at policing California's deregulated electricity mar-
kets resulted in a lawless frontier vulnerable to significant anticompeti-
tive conduct. That vulnerability remains even now, albeit somewhat
abated due to heightened public attention.
266. See CPUC REPORT, supra note 2, at 67.
267. See Joskow I, supra note 6, at 53.
268. Peterson. supra note 255, at Ai.
269. See Fellmeth, supra note 28, at 864.
270. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 5-
271. Id. at 8.
272. Id. at 5, 8.
273. Id. at 49.
274- Id. at 50.
275. See id. at 47, 50.
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Considering the U.S. Supreme Court declined to overrule the filed
rate doctrine in 1986,276 Congress has the responsibility to provide the
electricity markets with appropriate protection. As suggestions, two ave-
nues may prove fruitful.
First, Congress could overrule Keogh by statute, thus allowing the
courts to effectively oversee competitive electricity markets through anti-
trust laws. This would comport with past congressional policy of protect-
ing competition through antitrust laws.277 Private treble damages actions
would also provide sufficient deterrence to impede future anticompeti-
tive behavior.78
Alternatively, Congress could provide FERC with expanded legisla-
tive authority to impose substantial and meaningful penalties on parties
who commit anticompetitive conduct within deregulated electricity mar-
kets. This avenue is not as attractive as the first for several reasons. First,
FERC itself has suggested it lacks the expertise necessary to effectively
monitor deregulated electricity markets.279 The GAO buttressed this sug-
gestion in its analysis of FERC's performance during the crisis.28 Con-
gress would thus have to provide FERC with additional funding in order
to hire the personnel needed for effective oversight. Finally, such an ave-
nue would ignore the reliable policies of protecting competition through
antitrust laws, as well as deterring anticompetitive conduct through pri-
vate treble damages antitrust actions.
CONCLUSION
During the California electricity crisis, state residents and businesses
suffered thirty-eight days of blackouts and service interruptions over a
six-month period. The crisis caused significant price increases, resulted in
the bankruptcy of one of California's largest IOUs, and cost the state bil-
lions of dollars to recover. Certainly, this is not what California legisla-
tors or FERC intended when they placed the California electricity
markets on the road to deregulation.
While experts identified numerous causes of the crisis, including
flawed market rules and high consumer demand, several sources sug-
gested that the WEGs operating in California strategically manipulated
the electricity markets through anticompetitive conduct. These sources
also hinted the WEGs acted in concert in manipulating the markets.
276. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau Inc., 476 U.S. 409,424 (1986).
277. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
280. See GAO Report, supra note 5, at 65-66.
281. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 55:27i1
SHERMAN SHORTS OUT
At the turn of the 19th and 2oth centuries, Congress recognized that
collusive anticompetitive conduct endangered the free flow of supply and
demand in competitive markets. Through section i of the Sherman Act,
those conspiracies were "declared to be illegal."2'z For over one hundred
years, the courts have employed that simple but remarkably effective
statute to protect our nation's competitive markets.
Section i appears well-suited to provide appropriate remedies for
any anticompetitive conduct suffered during the crisis. It also could serve
as a powerful deterrent force to prevent future abuses, not just in Cali-
fornia, but also nationwide. Despite that strong fit, it does not appear the
nation's electricity markets can depend upon the protections of section i.
The filed rate doctrine, developed by the U.S. Supreme Court during an
era of highly regulated markets, has largely removed energy market par-
ticipants from accountability under section i. Yet the doctrine's applica-
tion to the California crisis invokes none of the policy concerns initially
addressed in its development. Legal commentators, including the Court,
have criticized it. And its poor fit to the crisis appears to militate against
its application. Yet it remains. Courts have begun applying it to section i
actions arising from the crisis, immunizing WEGs from accusations of
anticompetitive conduct and market manipulation.
The immunizing effect of the doctrine results in inadequate remedies
and the lack of any meaningful deterrent. FERC, which exclusively re-
views accusations of anticompetitive conduct in the electricity markets, is
ill-equipped to remedy abuses during the California crisis or deter future
abuses. The Agency lacks the power to award sufficient remedies or pen-
alties for anticompetitive conduct. Further, problems within the Agency
predict its continued inability to adequately oversee energy markets in
the future, at least without congressional intervention.
The Court indicated in 1986 that despite the origin of the filed rate
doctrine, it is up to Congress to take the initiative to return the protec-
tions of antitrust law to affected industries. As the push for the deregula-
tion of electricity markets continues, Congress should consider turning
the power back on for the Sherman Act.





AB 189o Public Utilities-Electrical Restructuring Assembly
Bill 189o(California's deregulation statute)
CAISO California Independent System Operator
CAPX California Power Exchange
CPUC California Public Utilities Commission
ERA Economic Regulatory Administration
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FPC Federal Power Commission (FERC's predecessor)
GAO U.S. General Accounting Office
ICC Interstate Commerce Commission
IOU Investor-owned utility
ISO Independent System Operator
PG&E Pacific Gas & Electric Company (an IOU)
SCEC Southern California Edison Company (an IOU)
SDG&E San Diego Gas & Electric Company (an IOU)
WEG Wholesale electricity generator
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